

Lessons Learned From A Vulnerable IoT Application


Daniel Xiapu Luo

Department of Computing

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

US hospitals hacked with ancient exploits

HOSPITAL #2
PACS



http://deceive.trapx.com/rs/929-JEW-675/images/AOA_Report_TrapX_MEDJACK.2.pdf₂

The company says the modern security systems in place at the hospitals did not eradicate the old malware using vulnerabilities such as [MS08-067](#) which was dangerous only to Windows XP systems.

Internet-connected Hello Barbie doll can be hacked

The iconic toy becomes a connected device, and promptly gets pegged for security issues.



2 COMMENTS



Jared Newman | @onejarednewman
PCWorld

Dec 7, 2015 9:17 AM

In news that should surprise no one, connecting a toy to the Internet invites the risk of hacking.

So it went with Hello Barbie, which lets children converse with the doll over a cloud server connection. As [reported by the Wall Street Journal](#), BlueBox Security and independent researcher Andrew Hay [uncovered several vulnerabilities](#) in the toy, the worst of which could allow an attacker to intercept a child's communications.

The good news is that ToyTalk, which partnered with Mattel on Hello Barbie, has been

VTech hack exposes ID theft risk in connecting kids to Internet



VTech's products are seen on display at a toy store in Hong Kong, China November 30, 2015. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu

1/2



By **Jim Finkle** and **Jeremy Wagstaff** | BOSTON/SINGAPORE

Parents who gave their child a Kidizoom smartwatch or a VTech InnoTab tablet may have exposed them to identity theft after Hong Kong-based VTech said hackers stole the personal information of more than 6 million children.

Watch out, new parents—internet-connected

[Welcome](#)[Manufacturers](#)[Countries](#)[Places](#)[Cities](#)[Timezones](#)[New online cameras](#)[FAQ](#)[Contacts](#)

IP cameras: Hong Kong

<http://www.insecam.org/en/>

« 1 2 3 4 5 »



atch Streamer camera in Hong Kong,Hong Kong



Watch PanasonicHD camera in Hong Kong,Hong Kong



Watch PanasonicHD camera in Hong Kong,Hong Kong



monitor to play the Police's "Every Breath You Take," followed by "sexual noises."

HP LaserJet Pro Printers remotely exploitable to gain unauthorized access to Wi-Fi and Printer Data

Tuesday, August 06, 2013 Mohit Kumar

 73  Like 358  Share 558  Tweet 287  Share 18  share 6013



Do you own an HP printer? If so, it may be vulnerable to Hackers. Multiple HP LaserJet Pro Printers are printer vulnerable to hackers according to a new advisory posted by the vendor, dubbed as [CVE-2013-4807](#) (SSRT101181).

Samsung smart fridge leaves Gmail logins open to attack

Failures in exploit discovery process are cold comfort for IoT fridge owners



24 Aug 2015 at 09:03, John Leyden



409

Update Security researchers have discovered a potential way to steal users' Gmail credentials from a Samsung smart fridge.

Pen Test Partners discovered the MITM (man-in-the-middle) vulnerability that facilitated the exploit during an IoT hacking challenge at the recent DEF CON hacking conference.

ANDY GREEN

HACK HIGH

HACKERS CUT A CORVETTE'S BRAKES VIA A COMMON CAR GADGET

ON THE



Security researchers Karl Koscher and Ian Foster.  RYAN YOUNG FOR WIRED

CAR HACKING DEMOS like last month's over-the-internet hijacking of a Jeep have shown it's possible for digital attackers to cross the gap between a car's cellular-connected infotainment system and its steering and brakes. But a new piece of research suggests there may be an even easier way for hackers to wirelessly access those critical driving



: Via Flickr

CONTENT

- ▶ Telematics and OBD-II
- ▶ Attack Surface of Telematics Systems
- ▶ A Vulnerable Telematics Device
- ▶ Exploit and Attacks
- ▶ Securing the Device
- ▶ Summary

Telematics



1 They fit a clever little device in your car




3 View feedback on your driving

<https://www.confused.com>

Telematics is revolutionising fleet management

Drivers are reconciling themselves to in-vehicle measurement technology



© Getty



APRIL 18, 2016 by: John Griffiths

Since its introduction 15 years ago, telematics has largely been regarded as a tool for recording where vehicles are and how long their journeys have taken. But as its technology becomes more sophisticated and fears of intrusive spying on drivers recede, telematics is now a vital part of fleet management.

\$140,100
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OBD2行車電腦

golo科技8 廣東 深圳



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- 行車油耗分析
- 駕駛行為分析

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golo車櫃 廣東 深圳



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手機抬頭顯示
OBD2行車電腦 藍牙4.0 無線

圖吧汽車衛士obd2藍牙行車電
腦車載智能盒子故障診斷儀汽車

圖吧導航旗艦店 北京



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手機抬頭顯示
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盒子 obd2藍牙汽車故障檢測儀

圖吧導航旗艦店 北京



¥218.00 銷量285

優駕 優駕車載智能盒子
高級版

3+5A
超強智能型

優駕車載智能盒子高級版OBD行
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優駕旗艦店 廣東 廣州



¥88.00 銷量26

車淨 樂乘盒子OBD2GPS 衛星定
位車輛故障診斷行車記錄儀遠程

雅琴天下電子商務有限公司



優駕 優駕車載智能盒子標準版

車況監測/油耗分析/抬頭顯示
炫酷儀表/駕駛優化/內置導航

十大功能



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GOLOX車輛定位

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
- 軌迹回放
- GPS定位
- 電子圍欄
- 震動報警
- 駕駛分析
- 車況監控

送 GOLO延長線+礼包 汽車故障診斷專家



KARTOR


OBD-II



- ▶ On-Board Diagnostic
 - ▶ Perform emissions related diagnostics;
 - ▶ Collect information from ECUs;
 - ▶ Set ECU parameters;
 - ▶ Monitor engine and vehicle and even driver behaviors;
 - ▶ ...

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App - OWASP Mobile Top 10



M1 - Improper
Platform Usage

M2 - Insecure
Data Storage

M3 - Insecure
Communication

M4 - Insecure
Authentication

M5 - Insufficient
Cryptography

M6 - Insecure
Authorization

M7 - Client
Code Quality

M8 - Code
Tampering

M9 - Reverse
Engineering

M10 -
Extraneous
Functionality

Web Services - OWASP Web Top 10

A1 - Injection

A2 - Broken
Authentication
and Session
Management

A3 - Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS)

A4 - Insecure
Direct Object
References

A5 - Security
Misconfiguration

A6 - Sensitive
Data Exposure

A7 - Missing
Function Level
Access Control

A8 - Cross-Site
Request Forgery
(CSRF)

A9 - Using
Components
with Known
Vulnerabilities

A10 -
Unvalidated
Redirects and
Forwards

Devices



- ▶ Insufficient Authentication/Authorization
- ▶ Lack of Transport Encryption
- ▶ Insecure Mobile Interface
- ▶ Insufficient Security Configurability
- ▶ Insecure Software/Firmware
- ▶ Poor Physical Security
- ▶ ...

https://www.owasp.org/images/7/71/Internet_of_Things_Top_Ten_2014-OWASP.pdf


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Disclaimer

- ▶ For the vulnerable telematics device, we have informed the corresponding company about the vulnerabilities and how to patch them with the help of HKCERT.

Mobile App



▼ obd

AlarmData
 BluetoothManager
 BrandSearchResult
 CandidateDeviceInfo
 CarBrandListItem
 CarDetail
 CarGenerationListItem
 CarModelInfo
 Checker
 CheckerMessage
 CheckerResult
 CheckerStepInfo
 CommandItemDesc
 CommandResultDesc
 CommandTable
 CompactObdService
 Config
 CustomCommandResult
 Db
 Device
 DeviceData
 DeviceInfo
 DeviceService
 ExtraTripInfo
 FaultCodeInfoItem
 FileUtils
 Firmware
 FirmwareFlash
 GpsInfo
 InitSdkData
 LocalCarModelInfoResult
 LocalUserCarResult
 LogcatThread
 MaintenanceError
 MaintenanceInfo
 MaintenanceParameters
 MaintenanceResult
 MaintenanceState
 MaintenanceTask
 Manager
 ManagerParams
 MileageSynchronizer
 MonthlyCalendar
 MonthlyList
 MonthlyReport
 MrRoute

Manifest

Resources

Assets

Certificate

Assembly

Decompiled Java

Strings

Constants

Notes

```

public void onProgress(int arg2, int arg3) {
    super.onProgress(arg2, arg3);
    if(this.val$callback != null) {
        this.val$callback.onDownProgress(arg2, arg3);
    }
}

public void onSuccess(int arg5, Header[] arg6, File arg7) {
    int v3 = 2;
    try {
        if(Log.isLoggable(LogTag.OTA, 2)) {
            Log.d(LogTag.OTA, "string.trim()-->" + Firmware.this.getOTAPath() + " file:"
                + arg7.getAbsolutePath() + " fileisExit:" + arg7.exists());
        }

        FileUtils.deleteGeneralFile(Firmware.this.getOTAPath());
        if(Log.isLoggable(LogTag.OTA, 2)) {
            Log.d(LogTag.OTA, " -->> 清除OTA文件夹下的所有文件成功----解压到:-->" + Firmware.this.getOTAPath());
        }

        FileUtils.upZipFile(arg7, Firmware.this.getOTAPath(), true);
        if(this.val$callback != null) {
            this.val$callback.onDownResult(20, arg7);
        }

        Firmware.this.saveLastDown(System.currentTimeMillis());
    }
    catch(Exception v0) {
        if(Log.isLoggable(LogTag.OTA, v3)) {
            Log.d(LogTag.OTA, " 解压失败-->> " + v0.getMessage());
        }

        if(this.val$callback != null) {
            this.val$callback.onDownResult(42, arg7);
        }

        v0.printStackTrace();
    }

    FileUtils.deleteGeneralFile(arg7.getAbsolutePath());
}
};

```



No Hardening and No Obfuscation!

Communication Channel

▼ obd

AlarmData

BluetoothManager

BrandSearchResult

CandidateDeviceInfo

CarBrandListItem

CarDetail

CarGenerationListItem

CarModelInfo

Checker

CheckerMessage

CheckerResult

CheckerStepInfo

CommandItemDesc

CommandResultDesc

CommandTable

CompactObdService

Config

CustomCommandResult

Db

Device

DeviceData

DeviceInfo

DeviceService

ExtraTripInfo

FaultCodeInfoItem

FileUtils

Firmware

FirmwareFlash

GpsInfo

InitSdkData

LocalCarModelInfoResult

LocalUserCarResult

LogcatThread

MaintenanceError

MaintenanceInfo

MaintenanceParameters

MaintenanceResult

MaintenanceState

Manifest

Resources

Assets

Certificate

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Notes

```
private boolean createSocket(boolean arg8, int arg9) {
    boolean v0_3;
    String v3;
    boolean v2 = false;
    if(!BluetoothManager.OTA_INFLUSHING) {
        if(arg8) {
            goto label_67;
        }

        try {
            v3 = "MSYNCSOCKET";
            __monitor_enter(v3);

        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            goto label_66;
        }

        try {
            if(1 == this.getConnectionState()) {
                this.setConnectionState(2);
                this.mBluetoothSocket = Build$VERSION.SDK_INT >= 10 ? this.mBluetoothDevice.createInsecureRfcommSocketToServiceRecord(
                    UUID.fromString("00001101-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB")) : this.mBluetoothDevice
                    .createRfcommSocketToServiceRecord(UUID.fromString("00001101-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB"));
            }


            __monitor_exit(v3);
            goto label_21;
        }
        label_63:
            __monitor_exit(v3);
    }
    catch(Throwable v0_1) {
        goto label_63;
    }
}
```


Device

- ▶ Microprocessor + Bluetooth + CAN
- ▶ No W/R protection
- ▶ Communicate with its app through Bluetooth



**Top Board:
Bluetooth**




Bottom Board: MCU + CAN

Device

Monitor CAN Messages

Since the firmware is not protected, we can extract it directly.




Monitor the Communication

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Exploit

Replace the original firmware
with a malicious firmware !



Woman Follows GPS, Drives Car Into Canada's Georgian Bay

By JULIA JACOBO · May 14, 2016, 12:09 PM ET

[Share with Facebook](#)

[Share with Twitter](#)



Andrea Vincze

WATCH | Woman Follows GPS, Drives Car Into Canada's Georgian Bay

11K
SHARES

Following directions from her car's GPS, a 23-year-old Canadian woman drove straight into a frigid Ontario bay earlier this week.

SQL Injection License Plate Hopes to Foil Euro Traffic Cameras



Joel Johnson

3/21/10 12:18pm · Filed to: IMAGECACHE



374.3K



175



1



Experiment Settings

- ▶ Volkswagen Magotan 1.8T 2015
- ▶ The vulnerable telematics device
- ▶ Android smartphone with a PoC attack app



DEMO

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App Security




- ▶ Secure data storage
- ▶ Secure communication
- ▶ Authentication
- ▶ Verify the update/firmware downloaded from the backend service
- ▶ Obfuscation and hardening
- ▶ ...

Device Security


- ▶ Verify the firmware before installing it
- ▶ Protect the existing firmware
- ▶ Avoid weak/default passwords
- ▶ Encrypt the traffic
- ▶ Mutual authentication
- ▶ Establish roots of trust
- ▶ ...



Web Service Security



https://www.owasp.org/images/9/9a/OWASP_Cheatsheets_Book.pdf



<https://www.owasp.org/images/1/19/OTGv4.pdf>

Summary

- ❖ Attack surface of the telematics systems
 - ❖ Device
 - ❖ Communication
 - ❖ App/backend service
- ❖ Securing IoT systems
 - ❖ Security, safety, reliability, resilience, privacy
 - ❖ Monitoring, analysis, and management
- ❖ We have been conducting research on mobile security and privacy, network and system security, IoT security, etc.
 - ❖ <https://www4.comp.polyu.edu.hk/~csxluo/>

THANKS!